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ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the ability of cash flow and earnings-based measures of return in the hospitality industry to assess the differences between target companies and their industries and to explain
target companies’ abnormal returns during takeover periods. Target company abnormal returns
observed during takeover periods are significantly related to both the difference between target
company and average industry earnings to total assets and the difference in cash flow to total assets.
Abnormal returns are negatively related to the difference in earnings to total assets, suggesting that
target company assets are underutilized. The difference between target company and target industry cash flow to total assets is positively related to target company abnormal returns, indicating that
acquiring companies value the near-term cash flow of target companies.
Keywords: abnormal returns, cash flows, earnings-based measures, takeovers, target companies

Introduction
Corporate takeovers continue to get attention from
both academics and practitioners (Kiymaz, 2013).
Takeover activities tend to be the greatest in periods
of general economic expansion (Lessard, Lucea, &
Vives, 2013). The motivations for takeover activities are building company capabilities, general economic integration, and corporate growth strategies
(Kiymaz, 2013; Lessard, Lucea, & Vives, 2013).
Canina (2009) indicated that in 2007 there were
435 hospitality related takeovers worldwide with a
total value of $109.7 billion. Corporate takeovers
are major events for individual firms and sometimes even for entire industries. It is not surprising
that the wealth effects of mergers attract significant
attention in financial research (Free, Hadlock, &
Pierce, 2012). Jarrel, Brickley, and Netter (1988),
using the stock price reactions during a short window around announcement dates, reported important gains from takeovers. Wealth gains accrue
almost entirely to the target company shareholders.
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) presented
evidence that the method of payment has an impact

on the reaction of stock markets to the takeover
announcement. Acquiring companies that pay with
stock tend to earn significant and negative abnormal returns around the announcement date, while
acquirers that finance the transaction with cash
earn no statistically significant abnormal returns
(Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001).
Some of the explanations proposed for takeovers
include increase in market power (Weber, 2004),
improvement in target management (Andrade,
Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001), production and distribution efficiencies and mitigation of hold-up problems (Williamson, 1975), and tax advantages (Heron
& Lie, 2002). The empirical evidence suggests the
overall gains from takeovers are small, with the target shareholders capturing most of the incremental
value. Using abnormal stock returns around takeover announcements as a proxy for value creation,
Andrade et al. (2001) report the mean combined
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for acquirers
and targets is 1.8% over the period 1973–1998. The
average CARs for the targets and the acquirers are
16% and −0.7%, respectively (Andrade et al., 2001).
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Low performance of stock acquirers can be related
to the signaling hypothesis of Myers and Majluf
(1984). In their information asymmetry model, a
cash financed takeover is interpreted by the market
as good news and a stock-for-stock takeover as bad
news. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) developed a model
in which the financial markets are strong-
form
inefficient, leading to the misevaluation of firms.
One of the implications of their model is overvalued acquirers make stock-for-stock bids for undervalued targets; the method of payment in mergers
reveals the prior misevaluation, causing a negative
market reaction.
In the hospitality industry the objectives of takeover are expansion, growth, and maximization of
shareholder value (Hsu & Jang, 2007). According
to Tsai, Pan, and Lee (2011), takeover in the hospitality industry results in major benefits in the form
of economies of scale and synergy for managers,
shareholders, and institutional investors. However,
Canina (2009) indicated that in theory the benefits
are true, but there are several problems that could
make the financial benefits less likely to materialize. Canina (2009) also stipulated that two-thirds of
takeovers fail to create shareholder value.
Prior studies on takeover in the hospitality industry used comparative analysis to examine motives
(Quek, 2011), market analysis, and accounting measures (Hsu & Jang, 2007; Yang, Qu, & Kim, 2009).
This research utilizes cash flow and earnings-based
measures of return to assess the differences in the
characteristics of target companies or acquired companies compared to their industries and to examine
the association of these measures with target companies’ abnormal returns during takeover using modified models from Stokes and Neuburger (1998).
Practitioners and the business media have raised concerns that the excessive focus on accounting earnings
rather than cash flow leads to suboptimal investment
decisions (Sloan, 1996; Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2007).
Literature Review
Cash Flow, Earnings, and Takeovers

Accrual accounting earnings has been a matter of
interest for managers, current and prospective owners of companies, and financial analysts in the hospitality industry (Andrew, Damitio, & Schmidgall,

2007; Canina, 2009; Tsai, Pan, & Lee, 2011). Cash
flow, a useful gauge of liquidity, has also been of
interest and in recent decades has received greater
attention from academics and accounting regulators (Andrew, Damitio, & Schmidgall, 2007;
Canina, 2009; Tsai, Pan, & Lee, 2011). Its supporters view joint earnings and cash flow reporting as
an improvement over the issuance of conventional
accrual accounting alone (e.g., Lee, 1972; Ashton,
1976; Ijiri, 1978; Belkaoui, 1988). A number of studies have examined, with mixed results, the usefulness of cash flow versus earnings for the purpose of
(1) predicting financial distress (Beaver, 1966; Casey
& Bartezack, 1985; Gentry, Newbold, & Whitford,
1985; Largay & Stickney, 1980); or (2) determining the information content of financial statements
(Rayburn, 1986; Wilson, 1987; Bowen, Burgstahler,
& Daley, 1987; Bernard & Stober, 1989).
If takeover bids arise as a result of target firm
undervaluation and/or managerial motives (Lev,
1983), then cash flow and earnings measures may be
useful tools for analyzing takeovers. Coffee (1988)
identifies several potential reasons for target companies’ undervaluation, including the failure of management to efficiently handle a company’s assets and
the risk aversion of managers who may be extremely
protective of their own authority. Under this scenario, motivation for a takeover bid stems from the
bidder’s desire to acquire an undervalued firm, displace current management, and exploit the disparity
between the target’s potential and current values.
Also, if firms become takeover targets due to
undervaluation, then it is possible that the economic characteristics underlying this undervaluation (e.g., inefficient use of assets) are reflected in
their accounting-based return measures. As such, the
earnings and cash flow to total assets ratios, relative
to the industry standard, provide an empirical prediction concerning the sources of value in takeovers
and the characteristics of takeover targets. This possibility is addressed empirically by an examination of
the target company’s earnings to total assets and cash
flow to total assets in comparison with the average
of these performance measures for companies in the
target’s industry. The following hypotheses, stated in
the alternative form, are tested:
H1a: D(E/TA) is less than zero.
H1b: D(CF/TA) is less than zero.

		

where
E/TA = earnings to total assets ratio,
CF/TA = cash flow to total assets ratio,
D(E/TA) = difference between target company
earnings to total assets and average earnings
to total assets for the target company’s
industry,
D(CF/TA) = difference between target company
and average industry cash flow to total assets,
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) = based on data from
the last full fiscal year prior to takeover
resolution.
Takeover results in a gain in wealth for target company’s shareholders (Dennis & McConnelly, 1986;
Huang & Walkling, 1987; Bradley, Desai, & Kim,
1988). Rejection of the null for H1a and H1b will
provide some indication that target companies are
poor performers compared to their industries. However, this alone will not demonstrate that poor performance is associated with the magnitude of the bid
in a takeover offer. The next section describes tests of
the association between relative target/industry performance and the abnormal stock returns earned by
target company shareholders.
Cash Flow, Earnings, and Takeover Abnormal
Returns

When companies become takeover targets due to
managements’ failure to efficiently employ assets
and this underperformance can be remedied by a
change in management, then, other things being
equal, the lower the performance of the target in
comparison to similar companies, the greater the
gain to the acquirer. Further, if economic performance is proxy by the target’s accounting measures
of return, the abnormal returns earned by target
shareholders during the takeover period should be
associated with target company cash flow and earnings to total assets relative to the industry standard.
Under this scenario, D(CF/TA) and D(E/TA) should
inversely proxy the extent to which an acquiring
company could better exploit the resources of the
target firm and, consequently, should be negatively
related to the share price increment that the bidding
company is willing to pay for the target. This leads to
the second hypothesis:

The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management

89

H2a: D(E/TA) is negatively related to target firm
cumulative abnormal returns observed during
the interval from the first announcement
of a takeover offer to the date of takeover
resolution.
H2b: D(CF/TA) is negatively related to
target firm cumulative abnormal returns
observed during the interval from the first
announcement of a takeover offer to the date
of takeover resolution.
To analyze the extent to which D(CF/TA) and
D(E/TA) can explain abnormal returns of targets,
the regression in equation (1) below is estimated.
Separate regressions of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) and on
D(CF/TA) are also reported in the result section.
CAR(T) = a0 + a1 D(CF/TA) + a2 D(E/TA) (1)
where
CAR(T) = the cumulative abnormal return of the
target over the takeover contest period,
D(CF/TA) = the difference between target
company T’s industry, and
D(E/TA) = the difference between target
company T’s earnings to total assets and
average earnings/total assets for T’s industry.
Additional factors have been found to influence
the magnitude of target company abnormal returns
during the course of a takeover contest. Huang and
Walkling (1987) have found that returns to target
shareholders are higher when the target’s management opposes the takeover and that more wealth is
created in cash transactions than in takeovers conducted all or partly by the exchange of securities.
Servaes (1992) also reported that multiple bidders
in the contest increased the returns to target shareholders. Finally Bradley et al. (1988) note that, with
the appearance of investment banking companies
specializing in financing takeovers and the creation
of anti-takeover devices, there has been a change in
the overall merger environment. These factors may
confound the results of the analysis shown in equation (2) below.
CAR(T) = b0 + a1 D(CF/TA) + b2 D(E/TA) +
b3 CASH + b4 HF + b5 BIDS + b6 SIZE
(2)
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CAR(T), D(CF/TA), and D(E/TA) are defined
above. The control variables have the following definitions: CASH is an indicator variable equaling one if
the takeover is primarily for cash and zero otherwise;
HF is an indicator variable equaling one if management’s reaction to the takeover indicates that it is
hostile and zero if friendly; BIDS is an indicator variable equaling one if there is more than one bidder for
the target and zero if there is only one bidder; and
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of
equity of the target firm at the beginning of the year
in which the takeover announcement is made.
For D(CF/TA) and D(E/TA) the expectations
remain the same. Given the discussion above, the
coefficients for CASH, HF, and BIDS are expected
to be positive. Because SIZE is included as general
control variables, there is no directional expectation
for their coefficients.
Research Method
Data Collection

A sample of completed takeovers was identified by
examining the COMPUSTAT Annual Research File
for companies delisted due to merger or acquisition
over the period 1994–2007. This period was selected
because it displays characteristics of the typical takeover through expansion (Corrao, 2012).
Companies in gaming, hotel, and restaurant
industries were included in the sample. Information on industry earnings, cash flow, and total assets
were collected from the COMPUSTAT Annual
Research File. Similar data for target companies
was collected from the COMPUSTAT Annual
Research File. Return data was collected from the
CRSP Daily Return File. Other information collected includes the date of the first takeover offer
for the target firm, the form of payment (cash, securities, or mixed cash and securities), the number of
bidding companies, and the nature of the takeover
(the takeover was viewed as friendly unless the
Wall Street Journal Index reported the opposition
of management to the offer). The Wall Street Journal Index on Mergers and Acquisitions (2007) is the
source of these information items.
The date of the first offer is the date on which the
first bid for the firm was made. In a multi-firm bidding contest, this date is not necessarily the date of

the first bid by the firm that eventually acquired the
target.
Analysis of Data

The final sample consists of 52 takeovers that were
completed between 1994 and 2007. Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by industry and
number of takeovers. Table 2 subdivides the sample
according to various merger characteristics. Due to
incomplete coverage in the Wall Street Journal Index
on Mergers and Acquisitions (2007), one or more
merger characteristics could not be determined for
a number of companies.
Calculation of Earnings and Cash Flow to Total
Assets

Earnings to total assets (E/TA) is calculated as earnings available to common shareholders in year t
Table 1. Frequency Distribution of Sample by Industry
and the Number of Takeover Targets (1994–2007)
Industry

Number of Takeovers

Gaming
Hotels
Restaurants
Total

11
22
19
52

Table 2A. Sample Frequency of Takeovers Classified by
Method of Payment
Method of Payment
Cash Payment
Securities
Mixed Cash and Securities
Total

Number of Firms
22
16
14
52

Percentage
42%
31%
27%
100%

Table 2B. Sample Frequency of Takeovers According to
Management Reaction to Offer
Management Reaction
Hostile Acquisition
Friendly Acquisition
Unknown
Total

Number of Firms
11
30
10
52

Percentage
21%
60%
19%
100%

Table 2C. Sample Frequency of Takeovers Classified by
Number of Bidders
Number of Bidders
1 Bidder
2 Bidders
3 Bidders
Unknown
Total

Number of Firms
32
8
4
8
52

Percentage
62%
15%
8%
15%
100%
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(data from COMPUSTAT) divided by closing total
assets from year t-1 (data from COMPUSTAT).
The calculation of cash flow for year t (CFt) is
shown in equation (3) below:
CFt = Earningst + Depreciationt +
Deferred Taxest –(Current Assetst –
Casht –Current Liabilitiest) +
(Current Assetst-1– Casht-1–
Current Liabilitiest-1)
where
Earnings = earnings available to common
shareholders,
Depreciation = current depreciation
and amortization expense (data from
COMPUSTAT),
Deferred Taxes = current deferred tax effect
on the income statement (data from
COMPUSTAT),
Current Assets = total current assets,
Current Liabilities = total current liabilities (data
from COMPUSTAT), and,
Cash = cash and short-term investments (data
from COMPUSTAT).
Cash flow to total assets (CF/TA) is calculated as
CFt divided by total assets as of the end of year t-1.
Estimation of Abnormal Returns

CAR(T) is calculated as follows. Daily returns from
the CRSP file are used to estimate market model
parameters:
Rjs = αj + βj Rms + εjs

of a merger offer (day O) is used. Day O is defined
as the day prior to the day that the announcement
of the offer was published in the Wall Street Journal.
Daily abnormal returns for firm j (ARjd) are the market model prediction errors for each day (d) in the
cumulative period:
ARjd = Rjd − (αj + βj Rmd)

(3)

(4)

where
Rjs = daily return on security j on day s,
Rms = value weighted return on the market on
day s,
εjs = normally distributed error term, and,
αj and βj = firm specific parameters to be
estimated.
An estimation period from days −210 to −12 relative to the date of the first public announcement
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(5)

Finally, the ARjd are cumulated to form CAR(T).
The cumulative period is from the date of the first
announcement of a merger offer to the date of shareholder approval of the merger. In some cases, the
target company’s stock was delisted prior to shareholder approval. In these cases, the cumulative of
abnormal returns is terminated at the delisting date.
The Cash Flow and Earnings Ratios of Target Firms

The cash flow and earnings to total assets ratios
(CF/TA and E/TA, respectively) for each of the
target companies were computed for the three fiscal years preceding the resolution of the takeover.
Average CF/TA and E/TA were also computed for
the industries (hotel, gaming, and restaurant) of the
target companies. E/TA and CF/TA for the target
companies were then compared to those in their
respective industries.
The comparisons of E/TA and CF/TA are in
Table 3. Mean E/TA for the takeover targets in the
three years preceding the resolution of the takeover
are −0.0180, −0.0230, and 0.0006. The comparative
industry ratios are 0.0400, 0.0321, and 0.0402. The
results of t-tests of differences between these ratios
indicate that target companies have significantly
lower mean E/TA ratios than the average for their
industries in each of the three years. Mean CF/TA
ratios of target firms are also significantly lower than
those for their industries in the three years prior to
resolution of the takeovers. Target companies’ mean
CF/TA is 0.0641 three years prior to takeover resolution, 0.0059 two years prior to resolution and 0.0461
one year prior to resolution. The related industry
ratios are 0.1020, 0.0853, and 0.0909. Median target CF/TA is less than median industry CF/TA, and
median target firm E/TA is greater than median
industry E/TA, but these differences are not statistically significant. These results suggest that many
target companies exhibited lower performance than
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Table 3. Comparison of Target Firms’ Earnings to Total Assets Ratios (E/TA) and Cash Flow to Total Assets Ratios (CF/TA) to
Industry Average
Target Firms
Year

Target Industry

Var

n

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

t-statisticb

t-3

E/TA
CF/TA

51
50

−0.0180
0.0641

0.0703
0.1030

0.0400
0.1020

0.0630
0.1211

−2.19**
−1.51*

t-2

E/TA
CF/TA

51
50

−0.0230
0.0059

0.0601
0.0871

0.0321
0.0853

0.0463
0.1087

−2.40***
−2.11**

t-1

E/TA
CF/I’A

50
50

0.0006
0.0461

0.0611
0.0859

0.0402
0.0909

0.0497
0.1029

−1.69**
−1.89**

a

Year t-i represents the i th complete fiscal year prior to the resolution of the takeover.
Test of the null hypothesis that D(E/TA) D(CF/TA) equals zero.
* Significant at a = 0.10, one-tailed test.
** Significant at a = 0.05, one-tailed test.
*** Significant at a = 0.01, one-tailed test.
a

b

other firms in their industry over an extended period
of time prior to the resolution of the takeovers.
Cash Flow, Earnings, and Target Firm Abnormal
Returns

Target companies’ cash flow and earnings to total
assets are lower than their industry averages in
the three years preceding the takeover completion.
In this section, the differences between target companies’ and industry average CF/TA and E/TA from
the last complete fiscal year prior to the resolution
of the takeover [D(CF/TA) and D(E/TA) respectively] are employed in an attempt to explain the
abnormal returns, which accrue to the shareholders
of target companies during the period of the takeover contest. Cumulative abnormal returns realized on target companies’ shares are regressed on
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA); if the value created in takeovers is greater when target companies have lower
cash flow and earnings per dollar of total assets relative to their industries, then the coefficients on these
variables should be negative.
The results of regression analyses of CAR(T) on
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA), both individually and
jointly, are reported in Table 4. Part A reports the
results of regressions in which CAR(T) is cumulated from the date of the first announcement of a
merger offer. Part B reports the results of regressions
in which CAR(T) is cumulated from one week (five
trading days) prior to the first announcement of a
merger offer.
In Part A, column 1, the regression of CAR(T)
on D(E/TA) is insignificant. Similarly, in column 3,

the coefficient for D(E/TA) is insignificant at conventional levels, although, in both regressions, the
sign agrees with H2a and H2b. The coefficients for
D(CF/TA) in the regressions reported in columns 2
and 3 of Part A are each significantly different than
zero, but the sign of the coefficients is positive, indicating that increasing cash flow per dollar of total
assets relative to the industry average is associated
with higher abnormal returns for their shareholders. This result does not agree with H2a and H2b,
which hypothesized a negative relationship between
CAR(T) and D(CF/TA), but may be indicative of a
desire, by acquiring companies, to quickly generate
cash to cover the cost of the takeover. Alternatively,
it may be related to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow
theory of takeovers whereby companies are taken
over to distribute cash flow that the target management is retaining for investment in negative net
present value projects.
Since abnormal returns are cumulated from one
week prior to the first public announcement of a
merger offer, similar, but quantitatively stronger,
results are observed. The coefficients for D(E/TA)
in columns l and 3 of Part B remain positive and,
in these regressions, are significant. D(CF/TA)
remains negatively correlated with CAR(T). This
suggests that information, or speculation, about the
merger offer was present in the market prior to
the public announcement reported by the Wall Street
Journal and that abnormal returns were accruing to
target firm shareholders in advance of the offer.
Similar regression results, which include the control variables, are reported in Table 5. In general,
the control variables add no explanatory power
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Table 4. Regression Results of Target Firm Abnormal Returns on D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA)a
Part A: CAR(T) from Takeover Offer Dateb
Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA)
Intercept
D(E/TA)
D(CF/TA)
F-statistic
Adjusted R2
n

0.231
−1.401

(0.01)***
(0.12)

2.711
0.052
31

(0.12)

Reg. of CAR(T) on D(CF/TA)
0.159

(0.01)***

1.163
3.986
0.087
30

(0.05)**
(0.05)**

Joint Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA)
& D(CF/TA)
0.192
−1.369
1.151
3.577
0.143
30

(0.01)***
(0.12)
(0.05)**
(0.05)**

Part B: CAR(T) from One Week prior to Takeover Offer Date
Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA)
Intercept
D(E/TA)
D(CF/TA)
F-statistic
Adjusted R2
n

0.298
−1.811

(0.01)***
(0.05)**

4.402
0.087
31

(0.05)**

Reg. of CAR(T) on D(CF/TA)
0.229

(0.01)***

1.489
7.801
0.167
30

(0.01)***
(0.01)***

Joint Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA)
& D(CF/TA)
0.27
−1.801
1.481
7.117
0.2703
30

(0.01)***
(0.05)**
(0.01)***
(0.01)***

D(E/TA) is the difference between target firm earnings to total assets and average earnings to total assets for the target firm’s industry.
D(CF/TA) is the difference between target firm and average industry cash flow to total assets. D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) are calculated from data
from the last full fiscal year prior to takeover resolution.
b
The takeover offer date is the date of the first announcement of an offer for the target firm in the takeover contest. It is not necessarily the
date of the first offer from the eventual acquirer. CAR(T) is cumulated from the offer date in Part A (one week prior to the offer date in Part
B), 0 to the date of target firm shareholder approval or exchange delisting, whichever is earlier.
Figures reported for regression variables are coefficient (two-tailed p-value); for F-statistic, F-statistic (p-value); for n, observations.
* Significant at α = 0.10, one-tailed test.
** Significant at α = 0.05, two-tailed test.
*** Significant at α = 0.01, two-tailed test.
a

to the regressions. The adjusted R2 of the regressions declined, and all of the regressions in Part A,
along with the regression in column 1 of Part B,
have insignificant F-statistics. In the two significant
regressions, reported in columns 2 and 3 of Part B,
D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) display the same relationship to CAR(T) as they did in the regressions
without control variables (see Table 4). Among the
control variables in these two regressions, only SIZE
has significant explanatory power.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study examined the cash flow to total assets and
earnings to total assets of a sample of 52 merger targets that were taken over in the period 1994–2007.
The first result of the study concerns the ability of
cash flow and earnings-based measures of return to
assess the differences between target companies and
their industries. More specifically, the results corroborate the general premise in the literature that
target companies are underperformers prior to the
acquisition compared to other companies in their

industries. They further indicate that this low performance is evident not only in an earnings-based
measure but also when a cash flow–based measure
is used.
Results indicate that cumulative abnormal
returns accruing to target company shareholders are
associated at 0.05 significance level with these measures of the relative performance of targets versus
their industries. As hypothesized, the target company versus industry difference in earnings to total
assets is negatively correlated with abnormal returns
earned by target shareholders, indicating that target
companies may be acquired to put their assets to a
more efficient use. Contrary to the study’s hypothesis, the target versus industry difference in cash flow
to assets is positively correlated to abnormal returns
earned by target shareholders. One interpretation is
that, while target companies underperform relative
to their industry in terms of cash flow generation,
acquiring companies value cash flow in merger targets and will pay a higher price to get it. This may
result from a desire for the acquiring company to
cover near-term costs of the merger. Alternatively,
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Table 5. Regression Results of CAR(T) on D(E/TA) and D(CF/TA) with Control Variables Related to Target Firm and Merger
Characteristicsa
Part A: CAR(T) from Takeover Offer Dateb

Intercept
HF
CASH
BIDS
D(E/TA)
D(CF/TA)
SIZE
F-statistic
Adjusted R2
n

Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA)

Reg. of CAR(T) on D(CF/TA)

0.109
−0.189
0.091
0.131
−1.397

(0.49)
(0.30)
(0.39)
(0.43)
(0.48)

−0.181
−0.251
0.089
0.192

(0.37)
(0.14)
(0.41)
(0.27)

0.029
0.701
−0.061
31

(0.51)
(0.63)

1.601
0.083
1.601
0.089
30

(0.01)***
(0.05)**
(0.21)

Joint Reg. of CAR(T) on D(E/TA)
& D(CF/TA)
−0.101
−0.258
0.091
0.188
−1.143
1.497
0.059
1.609
0.120
30

(0.60)
(0.12)
(0.39)
(0.21)
(0.25)
(0.05)**
(0.10)*
(0.19)

Part B: CAR(T) from One Week prior to Takeover Offer Date
(1)
Intercept
HF
CASH
BIDS
D(E/TA)
D(CF/TA)
SIZE
F-statistic
Adjusted R2
n

(2)

0.251
−0.170
0.080
0.088
−1.886

(0.19)
(0.31)
(0.51)
(0.49)
(0.05)*

0.017
0.079
−0.027
31

(0.61)
(0.56)

(3)

−0.089
−0.226
0.098
0.159

(0.59)
(0.21)
(0.39)
(0.30)

1.891
0.068
2.038
0.158
30

(0.01)***
(0.05)*
(0.05)*

0.010
−0.252
0.091
0.171
−1.701
1.798
0.061
2.501
0.241
30

(0.93)
(0.13)
(0.37)
(0.26)
(0.05)*
(0.01)***
(0.18)
(0.05)**

D(E/TA) (D[CF/TA]) is target firm earnings to total assets (cash flow to total assets) less average earnings to total assets (cash flow to total
assets) for the target’s industry calculated from data from the last fiscal year prior to takeover resolution. The indicator variables are: HF = 1 if
the merger is hostile; CASH = 1 if the merger is for cash; BIDS = 1 if there is more than one bidder for the target. SIZE is the natural log of the
target’s market value of equity at the beginning of the last year prior to the first takeover offer.
b
The takeover offer date is the date of the first announcement of an offer for the target firm in the takeover contest. It is not necessarily
the date of the first offer from the eventual acquirer. CAR(T) is cumulated from the offer date in Part A (one week prior to the offer date in
Part B), to the date of target firm shareholder approval or exchange delisting, whichever is earlier.
Figures reported for regression variables are coefficient (two-tailed p-value); for F-statistic, F-statistic (p-value); for n, observations.
* Significant at α = 0.10.
** Significant at α = 0.05.
*** Significant at α = 0.01.
a

while Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory is not
directly tested here, a possible interpretation of this
result is that target companies are being acquired to
release, or to better invest, cash flow that previous
management retained to invest in negative net present value projects.
Of the 52 completed takeovers over for the period
1994–2007, takeover targets have mean cash flow
and earnings to total assets below their industry
means in each of the three fiscal years preceding the
year in which the takeover was completed. If these
ratios are interpreted as measures of managerial performance, the implication is that target firms were
underperformers that may have been taken over for
a better use of their asset potential.
Abnormal returns observed for a target company
during the takeover period are significantly related to

the difference between the target company and target industry earnings to total assets ratios and to the
difference in cash flow to total assets ratios. Abnormal returns are negatively related to the difference
in the earnings to total assets ratio, suggesting that
target company assets are indeed underutilized.
The difference between target company and target
industry cash flow to total assets is positively related
to target company abnormal returns, suggesting that
acquiring companies value the near-term cash flow
of targets.
The results of this research will be useful information for practitioners planning to use cash flow
and earnings-based measures to identify the types
of target hospitality companies that will be profitable
after takeover. The findings can also assist the management of hospitality companies in making critical

		

strategic decisions relating to takeover of target hospitality companies. In addition, the results contribute
to the body of prior research supporting the fact that
hospitality companies can benefit from expansion
and growth through the takeover process. Finally,
this research presents empirical findings regarding
takeovers in the hospitality industry that was done
for the first time using cash flow and earnings-based
measurements in a modified model. Therefore, it
adds to the body of empirical research on mergers
and acquisitions in the hospitality industry.
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